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Introduction
	The saying “politics stop at the water’s edge” probably is not applicable to the case of Taiwan because “high” international politics and “low” domestic politics converge at the island state. The most prominent of the factors is Taiwan’s relations with China, which seem to penetrate to the core of Taiwan’s domestic politics and especially its electoral politics. While elsewhere, electoral politics tend to be defined by the prominence of national or domestic concerns, the China factor (as an external factor) affects Taiwan’s perception of it’s security, both political and economic, and influences citizens’ identity formation and political preferences. A complete picture requires us to examine the role of cross-Straits relations in defining voter identity.
	We will begin by briefly examining Taiwan’s economic relations with China and suggesting that despite greater interaction, the perceptions of Taiwan voters have not significantly changed in favor of China. In fact, we suggest that empirical evidence shows that Taiwan voters are ambivalent about the increasing cross-Strait economic interaction. The following section, we examine how this ambivalence and vulnerability has politicized Taiwan society and how this politicization helps paint a picture of who the Taiwan voter is. 

Cross-Straits Relations, the Economy, and Security
	One of the features of Taiwan’s economy after 1990 was increasing economic relations with China, which brought risks along with the profits. The obvious benefit was the relatively benign impact of the 2008 global financial crisis on the Taiwan economy as the growth in demand from China following the crisis alleviated the decline in orders from Europe and the United States. The increase in cross-Straits economic ties predates Taiwan’s inauguration of democracy, which began in the late 1980s. Although it was not officially sanctioned at the time, Taiwan companies and businesses had been trading and investing in China through third parties (mostly in Hong Kong). The surge in economic interactions was brought about by the convergence of several factors such as the relative political relaxation in Taiwan, but more noteworthy was the complementary change occurring in the industrial structures of the two economies, in which Taiwan’s industrial restructuring saw the manufacturing industries move to China. As these sunset (and generally more labor-intensive) factories migrated to China for production, they in fact established and created integrated production networks, further accelerating economic integration. How important is China to Taiwan’s economy? How integrated are the two economies? To answer these questions, two economic indicators are important—trade and investments. Figure 1 shows Taiwan’s exports and imports with China as a percentage of total exports and imports, while Figure 2 shows the amount of Taiwan’s annual investments in China.
	As Figure 1 shows, exports to and imports from China have increased substantially in the last twenty years. Since the first handover of executive office from the Kuomintang (KMT) to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2000, the annual increase in the China trade as a proportion of total Taiwan trade has steeply increased. Beginning at 2.9% of total exports in 2000, China became a major trade partner of Taiwan in the span of a decade, and by 2013 it accounted for 26.8% of Taiwan’s total exports. Although the import figures are significantly smaller, by 2010 imports from China accounted for about 15.8% of total Taiwan imports. Masked under these two statistics is the more important statistic—the huge trade surplus in favor of Taiwan. Since 1990, the trade surplus has favored Taiwan such that by 2013 it amounted to about US$39 billion. To simply state that numerous Taiwan businesses and companies are profiting hugely from the China trade is an understatement. 
					(Figure 1 about here)
	As with the surge in trade with China, Taiwan’s investments in China have also increased rapidly. Figure 2 shows the amount of investment in China on an annual basis. Although these figures were approved officially, they were very likely underreported. What is unmistakable is the rapid increase in the amount of Taiwan’s investments in China, which grew from US$2.6 billion in 2000 to more than US$14 billion in 2010 and US$9.2 billion in 2013. As mentioned earlier, the surge in investment is partly a consequence of Taiwan’s industrial restructuring, as labor-intensive industries looked to reduce their production costs, which increased due to the rising business costs in Taiwan. However, as Taiwan businesses and the economy benefit from the China trade, the rapid increase of Taiwan investment in China has constantly raised the specter of industrial hollowing-out, whereby manufacturing industries move out of Taiwan en masse leaving only administrative or design facilities. 
(Figure 2 about here)
	Besides the perils of industrial migration, the increasing trade and investments in China also means that Taiwan businesses are exposed to risk without any legal protection, because the two governments do not recognize each other or have any bilateral framework to address economic disputes. There is the fear within Taiwan that, beyond the China economic factor, Taiwan’s constrained international status is limiting Taiwan’s ability to be part of any burgeoning regional economic integration groups and thereby affecting Taiwan’s future economic performance. In this sense, the Ma administration’s push for the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China is perceived as a way to provide a legal framework for cross-Straits trade and investments, as well as to allow Taiwan tobe included in future regional economic integration. The ECFA, in one sense, can be seen as simply a de jure recognition of what is a de facto burgeoning cross-Straits economic tie that has been going on for decades. 
	If we follow the neoliberal perspective in international relations that increasing economic interdependence and functional relations will lead to greater trust and to peaceful relations between interdependent states, it provides us with only an incomplete picture of Taiwan’s perception of cross-Straits ties, because the politics of the ECFA also signals Taiwan’s own insecurity and sense of vulnerability.

	When asked to rate the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government’s attitude toward the Taiwan government and people, more than 40% of Taiwan respondents believe that the PRC government is unfriendly to the Taiwan people, and over half believe that China is unfriendly to the Taiwan government (except for a dip in 2011; see Table 1). The height of this hostility, from the Taiwan point of view, was greatest in the second-term campaign of independence-minded President Chen Shui-bian in 2004, where 79.4% of respondents believed that China is hostile to the Taiwan government. Juxtaposing the trade and investment statistics from 2000 to 2010 with the perceived hostility data is quite revealing. Contrary to the expectations of neoliberal and interdependence theory at a time when trade and investments are trending upward, the Taiwan people’s perception of hostility has stayed stubbornly high and has not declined in any appreciable way. 

				(Table 1 about here)
	The growing economic integration between China and Taiwan creates a threat to Taipei, due to China’s sovereignty claims over the island, and makes Taiwan vulnerable, due to its increasing economic dependence on China. There are concerns within Taiwan society about whether this dynamic represents a risk or an opportunity for Taiwan. This vulnerability affects Taiwan citizen’s perceptions of national security, driving a wedge among the elites—which is also reflected among Taiwan voters—and directly shapes contending strategies of how to best handle cross-Straits relations. The contentious politics took center stage during the negotiations and eventual signing of the ECFA. There is a very clear political divide, which is reflected in the positions of the two major parties. The KMT believes that expanding these ties is important for Taiwan’s continued economic dynamism, while the DPP argues that increasing economic ties with China threatens national sovereignty and security (Gold 2009). 
	This heightened sense of vulnerability and the divided outlook on how best to approach the cross-Strait economic policy is also reflected by citizens’ views on the pace of cross-Strait interactions. At the height of President Chen’s administration, a fairly large group of respondents believed that the pace of cross-Straits interactions was too slow (see 2004 and 2006 in Table 2) with more than one in four stating so. By 2008, the Three Direct Links, which began in November 2008, and then the broader ECFA in June 2010 triggered a significant swing to the “too fast” category, with more than one in three worried about the fast pace. This segmentation at the voter level is largely reflected in the divided discourse of party politicians, with the resultant political polarization at the elite and voter levels being duly noted by numerous political observers (Clark and Tan 2012b; Huang 2008; Liao and Yu 2008). It is fair, then, to infer that cross-Straits economic relations have become highly politicized (Clark and Tan, 2012b), a point that we will return to in the following section.
				(Table 2 about here)

	
Cross-Straits Economic Relations and the Voters
	In the previous section, we pointed out the highly politicized nature of cross-Straits economic relations (specifically the policy-making process in Taiwan) resulting from the drastically contrasting visions of the proper strategy to deal with cross-Straits ties. So how have cross-Straits economic relations become highly politicized? How does the Taiwan voter reflect the politicization of cross-Straits economic policy making? 
	The contradictory claims to sovereignty of the PRC and the ROC had underlain the conflicting relationship between these two polities since the end of the Chinese Civil War and the establishment of the PRC. Yet in the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, a seeming détente existed between the two states until the missile crisis in 1995–96, during Lee Teng-hui’s presidency. The détente broke down as a result of different and contradictory perceptions of territorial sovereignty despite the growing social and economic ties between the two countries. China calculated that growing ties would rein in separatism in Taiwan, while Taiwan’s democratization and growing economic wealth stimulated the growth of a Taiwanese identity separate from China (Clark and Tan 2012a,b). Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to state that Taiwan’s policies toward cross-Straits relations over the last two decades constitute a game in which domestic and foreign policy are closely intertwined as relations with China dominate the domestic political discourse and form the main political and social cleavage separating the two major parties—the KMT and DPP (Clark and Tan 2012a,b).  
	In the last section, we noted that the growing economic linkages have not lessened the feeling of hostility to China and vulnerability among Taiwan citizens, as shown by public opinion surveys. In fact, as mentioned earlier, Taiwan’s growing wealth and its democratization have stimulated Taiwanese identity formation and consciousness despite the growing economic links with China over the last two decades. Figure 3 shows Taiwan citizens’ perceptions of Chinese and Taiwanese identities.
(Figure 3 about here)
	When asked whether they consider themselves as having Taiwanese identity, Chinese, or both, increasing number of respondents consider themselves solely as having Taiwanese identity. The increase in Taiwanese identification is coupled with the decline in Chinese identity as well as in those identifying as both. The change in Taiwan consciousness occurred in a period in which trade, investments, and social and cultural contacts were increasing between China and Taiwan (see Figures 1 and 2). 
	As to China’s calculation that growing ties would curb separatism in Taiwan, the evidence does not seem to be encouraging from China’s perspective. Figure 4 shows citizen preferences on the issue of independence/unification. All options that include independence were grouped together, as were all with unification as a choice. 
(Figure 4 about here)
	When asked their preferences on the issue of independence/unification, a majority of respondents (62%) preferred the status quo, and this figure has stayed relatively unchanged since surveys on this question began. Observable inverse trends can be gleaned from the independence and the unification blocks, however. The preference for unification has declined significantly from one in four Taiwan citizens to one in ten, while independence was preferred by at least one in five in 2012, with a high of nearly one in four in 2008 and 2010. Yet again, comparing these statistics with the increasing economic interaction between China and Taiwan shows that there is no preference for Taiwan to be part of China anytime soon. Yet, are there conditions that affect the Taiwan voter’s preferences for independence or unification? 
	As China continues to grow and develop rapidly, the large difference in the standard of living between Taiwan and the PRC is slowly being reduced. Will preferences for independence or unification be affected by the “closing of the gap”? In the 2012 Taiwan National Security Survey, voters were asked whether they would support or oppose unification if there were little difference between the economic, political, and social conditions. As Figures 3 and 5 show, opposition to unification has actually increased since 2003 despite the increased cross-Straits interaction and China’s rapid economic development. The opposition to unification increased from just over 30% to more than 57% even if there was little to distinguish the PRC and Taiwan.
	Like Figure 4, the evidence in Figure 5 corroborates the decreasing preference to be part of a greater China. Yet Figure 5 goes farther and reveals that regardless of whether the gap between the two societies—in political, economic, and social conditions—is closed, Taiwan citizens are not keen to unify with China. This, in many ways, is closely related to the fact that they are forming an identity separate from China, as shown in Figure 3. In fact, if there is one choice that is clear, it is that fewer and fewer Taiwan citizens prefer to see Taiwan as part of a greater China.

(Figure 5 about here)
	Do these preferences color the Taiwan voters’ perception of cross-Straits economic relations and the benefits and costs that it entails? In other words, how politicized is the cross-Straits linkage, and how does it reflect who the Taiwan voter is? To answer these questions, let us look at how the evaluation of the economy, as well as the benefits of the ECFA, is affected by the preference for independence or unification and by party identification.
	Table 3 shows the distribution of how citizens evaluate the benefits of the ECFA based on their preferred position on the issue of independence/unification. Ignoring the middle categories of “status quo and decide later” and “status quo forever,” it is evident from the statistics shown in the table that preferences on the issue of independence/unification is highly correlated with respondents’ evaluations of the benefits of the ECFA. Citizens who have a preference for unification are less likely to claim that the ECFA is bad for Taiwan, whereas citizens who prefer independence are more likely to point out the costs to Taiwan’s economy by evaluating the country as worse off as a result of the ECFA. It is not difficult to infer from these numbers that evaluation of the ECFA is very much influenced by the citizens’ views on the independence/unification issue rather than the objective criteria of whether the economy is actually growing or not.

(Table 3 about here)
	Another way to view the politicization of Taiwan’s cross-Straits economic interaction is how different partisan identifiers evaluate the impact of the ECFA on the economy in general. Ignoring identifiers of the minor parties (regardless of whether they are Pan-Blue or Pan-Green), it is clear from the data in Table 4 that the respondents’ identification with the KMT or the DPP colors their views of the impact of the ECFA on the state of Taiwan’s economy. About 85% of DPP supporters claim that the ECFA has made Taiwan’s economy worse or kept it the same as before, while more than 69% of KMT supporters give a positive evaluation to the ECFA. Yet again, it is not too huge a leap to infer that the voters’ evaluations of cross-Straits economic relations are more probably based on their partisanship rather than on objective measures of general economic performance and health.

(Table 4 about here)
	The impact of partisan identification and preference on the independence/unification issue goes beyond just the evaluation of cross-Straits economic relations as symbolized by the ECFA; it also permeates and colors the Taiwan voters’ evaluations of the state of the general economy as well as their evaluations of their own personal economic situations. Table 5 shows how different respondents divided along their independence/unification preferences evaluate the state of Taiwan’s general economy. These figures correlate well with the evidence presented in Table 4 regarding the ECFA’s impact on Taiwan’s economy. In general, voters who preferred independence for Taiwan were more likely to evaluate the state of the economy poorly, while unifiers and status quo respondents had a generally more positive view.

(Table 5 about here)
	When approaching the ballot booth, however, Taiwan voters take on the China factor in a more subtle manner. While the evaluations of the ECFA can be filtered through their stance for unification or independence in the future—hence, generating favorable or unfavorable views on the economic pact, respectively—a closer look at the data reveals more about the intricacy of the electoral calculus. For those who rated the ECFA as beneficial for the Taiwan economy, three-quarters, or a majority, of respondents reported voting for the pro-unification KMT candidates Ma Ying-jeou and Wu Den-yih. Of those who viewed the ECFA negatively, only slightly half chose the DPP candidates Tsai Ing-wen and Su Jia-chyuan. The deciding voter group comprised those who believed that the economy is not affected either way by the ECFA. In this group, the KMT solicited much stronger support (46.7% versus 30.5% for the DPP). Even when including those who refused to respond, the opposition DPP was clearly unable to mount enough support by opposing the agreement.
	The evaluation of the economy and cross-Straits economic ties cannot be totally separated from the preference regarding national status as well as from the partisan identification that points to the obvious politicization and polarization along this dimension. When using objective economic indicators, such as economic growth, trade statistics, etc., the current statistics show that cross-Straits economic linkage is a boon for the Taiwan economy; for example, the huge trade surplus in favor of Taiwan that translates to huge capital inflows for Taiwan companies and to increasing foreign exchange reserves for Taiwan. It is also evident that Taiwan businesses benefit from investments in China, because the increasing amount of investment can be interpreted to mean that there is still profit to be made despite some stories of failed investments and corporate bankruptcies.
	Is Taiwan’s economy more vulnerable and less secure as interaction with China increases? Since politics is an interplay of subjective and objective realities, the Taiwan voters’ responses to this question largely depend on the ideological and partisan lenses they wear—where the voter stands depends on where they sit regarding their partisan identification. 

Some Concluding Thoughts	
	This chapter explores the complex dynamics behind the relationship between cross-Straits economic ties and elections in Taiwan. Specifically, we examine how the burgeoning cross-Straits economic transactions affect the perceptions of the Taiwan voters on how they perceive the vulnerability and security of Taiwan, as well as the perils and profits of this economic interaction for Taiwan’s destiny (and for their own economic welfare).  
	Taiwan voters are clearly concerned with the cross-Straits relations (and relatedly the economic interactions) between the two sides. This important factor affects not only how voters on the island view their future but also how they choose their government. That subtle calculus is reflected in party identification and perceptions of the national economy. From the empirical evidence we present in this chapter, we demonstrate that the connections between the issues of economic development and fostering cross-Straits relations, and subsequently how the voters cast their ballots, are convoluted. With the status quo option available, for instance, voters evade directly factoring in the choice of unification or independence (at least not immediately) when choosing the government but instead are inclined to resort to a party that can negotiation a fine balance as far as dealing with the Chinese government is concerned. For the Taiwan voters, being economically and politically isolated are clearly not good for the economy, yet getting too close to China could be inviting trouble. This view explains the shift of public opinion after the pro-unification KMT returned to power in 2008. Since then, more and more voters have come to believe that the pace of cross-Straits interactions has been too fast and that the government should put a brake on unification (see Figures 3 and 6). This is quite an about-face compared to the DPP administration in the 2000–2008 period.
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Figure 1.	Taiwan’s Trade with China.





Figure 2.	Official Approved Investments of Taiwan in China.
	
Source: Cross-Straits Economic Monthly Report, Mainland Affairs Council, http://www.mac.gov.tw (​http:​/​​/​www.mac.gov.tw​) (accessed April 19, 2014).

Figure 3. Taiwan Citizens’ Perceptions of Chinese/Taiwanese Identities.






Figure 4. Citizen Preferences for Unification/Independence.
			





Figure 5. Support for Unification If There Is Little Difference between PRC and Taiwan.









Source: Mainland Affairs Council, ROC, http://www.mac.gov.tw/ (​http:​/​​/​www.mac.gov.tw​/​​) (accessed )
Table 2. Views on the Pace of Cross-Straits Interactions, 2001–2008.


























Source: Mainland Affairs Council, ROC, http://www.mac.gov.tw/ (​http:​/​​/​www.mac.gov.tw​/​​) (accessed ).
Table 3. Evaluation of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement on the Economy by Independence/Unification Preference. 
	Better	Worse	About the same
Unify now	2.10%	0.50%	1.70%
Maintain status quo, unification later	16.10	5.20	8.20
Maintain status quo and decide later	46.50	24.40	35.90
Maintain status quo forever	23.00	20.70	21.30























Table 5. Evaluation of the Economy by Independence/Unification Preference.
	Better	Worse	About the Same
Unify now	2.90%	1.50%	1.10%
Maintain status quo, unification later	14.10	8.40	11.40
Maintain status quo and decide later	39.90	32.60	42.00
Maintain status quo forever	25.50	22.10	21.00




Source: TEDS 2012, Election Study Center, National Cheng-chi University.


 



4



3



